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DEVELOPING A CONSUMER RIGHT TO
INVOKE THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION TO THE
INSURANCE COMPANY EXEMPTION FROM
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
I. Introduction
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' provides that the business of insur-
ance shall be subject to the laws of the several states which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business. The Act further pro-
vides that the business of insurance shall be exempt from federal
antitrust laws if state regulation exists.' However, an exception to
this exemption exists in section 3(b) of the McCarran Act.3 Section
3(b) provides that nothing within the McCarran Act shall render the
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.4
Despite the seemingly clear statutory language of section 3(b), the
trend of judicial construction of this statute until recently had been
to narrow substantially this exception to the federal antitrust ex-
emption.
Until the decisions of the First Circuit in Barry v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co.5 and the District of Columbia Circuit in Proctor
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,' the courts refused to
permit consumers of insurance to invoke the McCarran Act's boy-
cott exception.7 In the Barry decision however, Chief Judge Coffin
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970) [hereinafter the McCarran Act or The Act.] Id. § 1012(a).
2. Id. § 1012(b).
3. Id. § 1013(b).
4. Id. The actual language of § 1013(b) reads as follows: "[Niothing contained in this
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce,
or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
5. 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977).
6. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7. The court generally found that Congress's intent was to protect small insurance compa-
nies and agents from being placed on a blacklist by large insurance companies. Those compa-
nies and agents placed on the blacklist were not allowed to sell the products of the large
companies which dominated the industry. See Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503
F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27
(D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir 1977); Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins.
Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F.
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allowed plaintiff doctors, to invoke section 3(b) in a suit in which
they alleged that several insurance companies violated the federal
antitrust laws by conspiring to shrink malpractice coverage avail-
able to Rhode Island doctors.' In Proctor, after a close examination
of the Act's legislative history, the District of Columbia Circuit also
rejected the narrow construction of the boycott exception that only
insurance agents and companies can invoke section 3(b)?
In allowing a broader scope to the boycott exception, these two
circuits disagreed with what the Barry court described as a
"formidable array of authorities."'" This Note will examine the leg-
islative history of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
authorities which provided the traditional narrow interpretation of
the boycott exception, and the effects of the Barry and Proctor
decisions on insurance companies and consumers.
II. Legislative History of Section 3(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act
In 1869, the United States Supreme Court declared that "issuing
a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce"" and that
state regulation of insurance did not impinge upon the federal gov-
ernment's power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court held
this view until 194412 when it decided United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. '1 In that decision, the Supreme Court
declared that a fire insurance company which conducted a substan-
tial part of its business across state lines was engaged in "commerce
among the several States" and subject to Congressional regulation
under the Commerce Clause. 4 As a result, federal antitrust laws
Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life and Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp.
343 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.C. Mo. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 67 F.R.D.
643 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
8. 555 F.2d at 12.
9. 561 F.2d at 272.
10. 555 F.2d at 7.
11. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869).
12. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
13. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See note 39 infra.
14. Id. at 553. The Court distinguished Paul v. Virginia and its progeny as dealing with
the constitutionality of state rather than federal legislation. The Court also viewed the nature
and size of the insurance business and concluded that insurance was part of interstate com-
merce. Id. at 539-53.
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were held to be applicable to insurance companies. The imposition
of federal law where state taxation and regulation had governed
raised many uncertainties. 5
As a response to the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, Con-
gress hurriedly passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act which returned
primary responsibility for insurance regulation and taxation to the
states." The Act stated that no act of Congress, other than a law
specifically relating to the business of insurance was to be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supercede state tax and regulatory laws. 7
The possible application of the Sherman, Clayton, Federal Trade
Commission, and Robinson-Patman Acts to the business of insur-
ance was suspended until June 30, 1948. " Thereafter, the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts were not to apply to
the business of insurance to the extent that it was regulated by state
law. 9 However, agreements or acts to boycott, coerce, or intimidate
were to remain subject to the Sherman Act regardless of state regu-
lation.20The draft of the bill introduced by Senators McCarran and Fergu-
son had originally been prepared by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners.' The reports accompanying the two bills
being debated in the House and the Senate both referred to the
boycott provision, stating: "These provisions of the Sherman Act
remain in full force and effect." 2 These reports provide evidence
15. See Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 473, 476-79. (1950). Many state officials and insurance executives feared that the
foundations of state regulation and taxation had been shaken by the decision. Id. at 476. State
government officials felt that the decision was motivated by the desire of the Washington
bureaucrats to derive some benefit from "the huge pool of assets accumulated by the insur-
ance companies." 44 Col. L. Rev. 772, 772-73. n. 10 (1944). Public opinion, as reflected by
the press, was; in general, violently opposed to the decision. Id.
16. See Comment, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Pro-competitive Reform, 29
Vand. L. Rev. 1271, 1277 (1976). In fact, even before the South-Eastern Underwriters opinion
was announced, the House had passed a bill exempting the insurance industry from the
antitrust laws. 90 Cong. Rec. 6565 (1944). However, the bill was killed in the Senate. Id. at
8054.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
18. Id. § 1013(b).
19. Id. § 1012(b).
20. Id. § 1013(b).
21. 29 Vand. L. Rev. 1271, 1276. The Senate version of the bill was printed in the
Congressional Record on the first day of the Senate debate. 91 Cong. Rec. 478 (1945). The
House version appears at 91 Cong. Rec. 1085 (1945).
22. S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), accompanying S. 340; and H. Rep. No.
1978]
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that the boycott exception was not intended to be confined to
blacklists of insurance companies and agents. In its analysis of the
bill, the Senate Report describes the boycott provision as follows:
"[T]he boycott section provides that at no time are the prohibi-
tions in the Sherman Act against any agreement or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation suspended. These provisions of the Sher-
man Act remain in full force and effect. 2
3
Amendments in both houses of Congress added provisions which
broadened the coverage of section 3(b). 24 In the Senate, the amend-
ment changed the language of the statute from "Nothing contained
in this section shall render the Sherman Act in applicable to any
agreement or act of boycott . " to "[N]othing in this act . ."2
In the House, the language concerning "agreement" to boycott
which had been stricken in committee was placed back in the bill.
Congressman Celler had argued for restoration of the "agreement"
language. 6 Celler was fearful of oral blacklists being issued by large
companies which "[wiould frighten the wits out of all these small
companies."21 He was also concerned with the possibility that agree-
ments of "separation" would bar a company whose agent wrote
insurance for a blacklisted company from participation in the self-
governing organizations of the industry.28
However, subsequent debates indicate that section 3(b) was not
concerned merely with blacklists. In the debate on the conference
report in the Senate, Senator Claude Pepper suggested that the
states would take action during the moratorium period to defeat the
purpose of the antitrust acts.29 Senator Ferguson replied that the
states could not, even during the moratorium, "interfere with the
application of the Sherman Act to any agreement . . . or . . .act
of boycotting."30 Senator Pepper remained concerned that the state
legislatures and the state rating bureaus, which were largely con-
trolled by the influence of the insurance industry, would enact legis-
143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
23. S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
24. 91 Cong. Rec. 479,1088 (1945).
25. Id. at 479.
26. Id. at 1087.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1443.
30. Id.
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lation that would permanently usurp the applicability of the Sher-
man, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts."' In reply, Sen-
ator O'Mahoney, one of the bill's managers, tried to make clear that
while the McCarran Act approved state regulation of the business
of insurance, it did not sanction "regulation by private combina-
tions and groups."32 Senator O'Mahoney assured Senator Pepper
that private agreements enforcing certain rates would remain viola-
tions as a result of the restoration by the House of the "agreement"
language.3 He assessed the importance of the boycott provision as
follows: "[A]ny attempt by a small group of insurance companies
to enter into an agreement by which they would penalize any person
or business in the insurance field in a way that was disapproved by
them, would be absolutely prohibited by this provision. ' 34
Senator Pepper still remained adamant in his opposition to the
bill because it allowed state rating bureaus to set prices. Senator
O'Mahoney believed that "[t]he vice in the insurance industry
. . . was not that there were rating bureaus, but that there was in
the industry a system of private government which had been built
up by a small group of insurance companies, which companies un-
dertook by their agreements and understandings to invade the field
of Congress to regulate commerce."3
In response to an inquiry by Senator Barkley about whether the
boycott provision was sufficient to prevent combinations that did
not involve boycott, coercion, or intimidation, Senator O'Mahoney
took a very broad view of the scope of section 3(b). ? He stated:
"[M]y judgment is that every effective combination or agreement
to carry out a program against the public interest of which I have
had any knowledge in this whole insurance study would be prohib-
ited by the [boycott] section . . ."
Soon after this exchange, the conference report was accepted.
Clearly, while blacklists were a concern of Congress, the debates
reflect that they were only one of many concerns. Fears of price-
31. Id. at 1480.
32. 91 Cong. Rec. 1483 (1945).
33. Id. at 1480.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1484.
36. Id. at 1485.
37. Id. at 1486.
38. Id.
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fixing and private regulation by insurance combinations through
private rules also shaped the final language of the boycott provision.
An examination of the impetus for the passage of the McCarran
Act also discloses a concern with more than just blacklists. The
boycott provision was intended to preserve South-Eastern
Underwriters to the extent that the latter subjected acts of "boycott,
coercion, or intimidation" to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.3
While a blacklist of insurance companies and agents had been al-
leged in that case, another type of boycott was also involved."
Policyholders of insurance companies that were not members of the
association "[w]ere threatened with boycotts and withdrawal of all
patronage."'" The Supreme Court explicitly addressed itself to such
conduct and found it to be illegal.4"
III. Judicial Construction of the Boycott Exception
A. The Narrow View
Despite the seemingly clear and broad scope of section 3(b), a
split in the circuit courts developed as to the proper scope of the
McCarran Act's boycott exception. The Fifth Circuit in Meicler v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.43 and the Ninth Circuit in Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States" took a nar-
row view of the exception. They limited standing to invoke the
exception to insurance companies and agents who have been the
subject of blacklists by other insurance companies. The courts
based their views on their reading of the legislative history of the
boycott exception. Several district courts followed this line of inter-
pretation."
39. The indictment in the case alleged a conspiracy by an association of insurance compa-
nies and agents to fix premiums and to monopolize the insurance business. The indictment
also charged additional violations of the Sherman Act, involving practices in aid of the price-
fixing and monopolization scheme. The Supreme Court used the terms "boycott",
"coercion", and "intimidation" to describe these additional practices. 322 U.S. at 535-36.
40. Id. at 535.
41. Id. at 536. The Court described the acts of boycott, coercion, and intimidation as
follows: "[Tihe conspirators not only fixed premium rates and agent's commissions, but
employed boycottts together with other types of coercion and intimdation to force non-
member insurance companies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who needed insur-
ance to buy only from S.E.U.A. members on S.E.U.A. terms." Id.
42. Id. at 562.
43. 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
45. See note 6 supra.
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The line of cases which gives a narrow construction to the boycott
exception began with a District Court decision, Transnational Ins.
Co. v. Rosenlund.5 In that case, plantiff insurance company entered
into an agreement by which two individuals and the Maclund Cor-
poration agreed to maintain a general agency for the solicitation and
underwriting of mobile-home insurance." After sales in this line of
insurance began to decline, the individuals sold'the Maclund Corpo-
ration to a third party, the Foremost Insurance Company." As part
of the sales agreement, Rosenlund and MacTarnahan agreed to
work diligently with Foremost to use their best efforts for a period
of four years from the effective date of the agreement to persuade
all existing accounts to write all future mobile-home business with
Foremost. 9 Transnational claimed that this sale was a breach of its
agreement with Maclund and the two individuals. 0 Transnational
also claimed that the covenant not to compete in the Maclund-
Foremost contract amounted to an agreement to boycott and as
such fell within the boycott exception of section 3(b) of the McCar-
ran Act." As a result, plantiff claimed that the Sherman Act applied
to this conduct. 2
The district court referred to the legislative history of section 3(b)
of the McCarran Act and determined that it dealt with the black-
listing of companies and agents and not with the activity described
in the complaint.5 3 Even when it assumed that the exception was
applicable the court found that there was nothing in the record to
indicate a boycott, coercion, or intimidation.54 The court viewed the
46. 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
47. Id. at 16-17. The two individuals were Ralph E. Rosenlund and Robert M. MacTarna-
han.
48. Id. at 17-18.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Transnational also alleged a violation by the defendants of fiduciary duties owed
Transnational by them as its agents. A third cause alleged that Rosenlund and MacTarnahan
were unjustly enriched by the payment by Foremost of valuable consideration for their per-
formance of the Foremost-Maclund agreement. Id. at 18-19.
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id. at 25-26.
53. Id. at 26. The court stated, "[tihe legislative history shows that the boycott, coercion
and intimidation exception, was placed in the legislation to protect insurance agents ...
Id.
54. Id. at 27. The court felt that to fall within the accepted meaning of boycott, there must
be: (1) a concerted refrainment from business relations with another, or (2) a concerted
persuasion of third persons outside the combination to so refrain.
19781
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covenant not to compete as an agreement in which Rosenlund and
MacTarnahan were urged to do business with Foremost, and not as
an agreement in which a competitor was urged not to do business
or to refrain from doing business with another.5
Although Transnational made broad references to "the legislative
history" of section 3(b), it cited only a single page from the
Congressional Record which contained a floor speech by Congress-
man Emanuel Celler56 In that speech, Congressman Celler urged
that the boycott exception be drafted so as to cover both agreements
and acts of boycott, coercion, and intimidation." However, there is
nothing in Congressman Celler's speech to indicate that these were
the only activities to be covered by the boycott exception. In fact,
other speeches pointed out that such blacklists were not the sole
concern of Congress.
The Transnational view stood alone until 1974 when the Ninth
Circuit followed this narrow view of the scope of section 3(b) in
Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.5" In Addrisi, a policy-
holder sought Clayton and Sherman Act damages against Equitable
because of its insurance-lender enterprises.' As a condition to mak-
ing Assured Home Owner loans for the purpose of purchasing
homes, Equitable required the purchase of a type of "cash value"
life insurance policy known as the "Adjustable Whole Life Policy.""
This policy was costly to the purchaser.12 Because of the tie-in re-
quirement of the purchase of such a policy with the making of the
loan, the plantiff alleged that the agent exerted economic coercion
upon prospective borrowers to purchase the policy."
55. Id. The Court distinguished Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). In that case, there was a ten year covenant not to compete in
connection with the purchase of assets in a scheme of acquisitions. The Transnational court
noted that the Supreme Court did not call that covenant a "boycott". The Maryland &
Virginia case also involved different claims. The defendants were charged with an attempt
to monpolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act and it was claimed that the defendant's
gathering of assets might tend to substantially lessen competition under section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Id. at 28.
56. 91 Cong. Rec. 1087 (1945).
57. Id.
58. See notes 30-39 and accompanying text supra.
59. 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
60. Id. at 726.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit found that Equitable was engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance at the time of such conduct, and as a result was
subject to state regulation.84 The court also found that the State of
California regulated the business of insurance and therefore Equita-
ble's activities were exempt from the federal antitrust laws. 5 The
court next addressed the issue of whether the claim of alleged
economic coercion against the policyholder was viable under section
3(b). Here the court followed the narrow reading of the statute.
It stated:
[ilt is evident from an examination of the legislative history behind § 1013
(b) that the intent of Congress was to reserve into the reach of the Sherman
Act only a narrow area of. restraint of trade activity among those in the
business of insurance, namely, antitrust acts among 'insurance companies
and agents for the purpose of boycott or coercion among insurance companies
and agents."
Thus, the court refused to allow the plaintiff policyholder-consumer
to invoke the boycott exception.
The Fifth Circuit in Meicler v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.6"
also relied on the examination of the legislative history provided by
Transnational.8 In Meicler, the plantiffs were automobile owners
who were covered by automobile insurance. When they reapplied for
auto insurance, they discovered that they had been reclassified and
placed in a less favorable risk category." When the plantiffs at-
tempted to purchase insurance from several other companies under
their old classification :and premium rate, they were told that they
could only obtain insurance at the higher-premium rate in the less
favorable risk classification category. 0 Plantiffs tried to invoke the
boycott exception provision of the McCarran Act. However, the
court affirmed the district court's view that policyholders or mem-
bers of the public could not seek the benefit of this provision." The
court stated: " .... [tihe legislative history indicates that the
64. Id. at 727-28; see 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1970).
65. Id. at 728; see 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
66. Id. at 728-29.
67. 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. The Fifth Circuit specifically referred to the 'district court's'use of the Transnational
analysis. Id. at 734.
69. Id. at 733.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 734.
19781
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boycott exception was designed to reach insurance company 'black-
lists' rather than refusal to sell to a particular segment of the public
at other than a specified price."72 Clearly, a very narrow approach
was being taken although the focus of the McCarran Act was on the
relationship between an insurance company and its policyholders.73
The Meicler court also stated that a broad construction of the
boycott exception would emasculate the antitrust exemption con-
tained in section 2(b) of the Act.74 The reasoning behind this view
is that if a broad reading is given to section 3(b), federal antitrust
laws would be applicable to the business of insurance if a plantiff
stated the occurrence of a boycott, coercion, or intimidaton. The
court feared that a broad construction of the exception would swal-
law the antitrust exemption.75
B. Broad Construction of the Boycott Exception.
Another line of decisions concerning the scope of section 3(b)
exception gave a broader range to the boycott exception. This line
of reasoning is gaining wider acceptance."5
Even prior to the Transnational decision, the Second Circuit in
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.77 gave a
broad reading to the boycott exception by stating that section 3(b)
covered "all boycotts or agreements to boycott condemned by the
Sherman Act"."5 The court also allowed the treble-damage provision
72. Id.
73. 503 F.2d at 728.
74. 506 F.2d at 734.
75. 561 F.2d at 274. In addition to these circuit court decisions, several district courts have
followed a narrow construction of the boycott exception by limiting it to the blacklist situa-
tion. See note 7 supra. These decisions interpret the legislative history in a manner similar
to the Transnational decision. They also state a fear of emasculation or vitiation of the
McCarran antitrust exemption if a broad reading is given to section 3(b) of the Act. See 506
F.2d at 734 and 503 F.2d at 729. None of these cases appear to have made a thorough,
independent investigation into the legislative history of the boycott exception. Instead they
rely heavily on the language used in Transnational.
76. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Barry v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977); Ballard v. Blue Shield of W. Va.,
Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976).
77. 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
78. Id. at 846. The issue in the case involved whether private treble damage action was
available for illegal boycotts in the insurance industry. If the Second Circuit had read section
3(b) narrowly, it could have found that the section 3(b) exception related only to the Sherman
Act and could not be construed to embrace the treble damages provision of section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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of the Clayton Act to remain applicable to boycott actions despite
it's non-inclusion in section 3(b).11 Although this decision did not
deal with standing to invoke section 3(b), it did show by implication
the willingness of the Second Circuit to adopt a broad view of the
coverage of the boycott exception. 0
In Battle v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co.,8' the Fifth Circuit in
a pre-Meicler decision 2 appeared to allow standing to plantiffs other
than insurance companies and agents under section 3(b). 3 In
Battle, the circuit court reinstated a compl'aint which had been
dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.84 The complaint alleged boycott, coercion,
and intimidation activity on the part of an insurance company and
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Brown-Service Funeral Homes Com-
pany, Inc., against funeral homes and funeral directors. 5 The court
in Battle showed a willingness to interpret literally the language of
the boycott provision.
The Fourth Circuit in Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. W. Va., Inc. 6
also took a broad view of whom has standing to invoke the boycott
exception. In Ballard, a group of West Virginia chiropractors sued
Blue-Cross-Blue Shield alleging a conspiracy to refuse health insur-
ance coverage for chiropractic services. 7 The district court dis-
missed the case on the pleadings, holding that the McCarran Act
exempted the defendants' activities from the antitrust laws. 8 How-
79. Id.; See also 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970). The court reasoned that the treble damages
provision of the Clayton Act is a significant part of the antitrust law and as such should apply.
80. It should be noted that the parties to this suit were both insurance companies. There-
fore, even if the issue of narrow standing had been raised here, Monarch Life would still have
had standing to invoke section 3(b).
81. 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
82. See note 67 supra.
83. 493 F.2d at 44.
84. 493 F.2d at 42-43. The Liberty National Insurance Co. issued burial insurance policies.
Brown-Service Funeral Homes contracted with Liberty National to furnish merchandise and
services required by the burial insurance policies. Brown-Service then contracted with inde-
pendent funeral homes in Alabama. Any funeral home which signed with Brown-Service
became an "authorized" home for servicing and furnishing merchandise to Liberty National
burial insurance policyholders. The services provided under the policy differed significantly,
depending on whether an insured uses an authorized or unauthorized funeral home.
85. Id. at 51-52.
86. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir 1976).
87. Id. at 1077.
88. Id. The district court also found that the alleged conduct did not affect interstate
1978]
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ever, the circuit court found that the allegations sufficiently stated
a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act. 9 It also found that
the federal antitrust laws were applicable and reinstated the ac-
tion.'" The allegations in Ballard would not have fallen into the
narrow interpretation of the section 3(b) exception since plantiffs
were not insurance companies or agents. The Fourth Circuit used
the broader approach and construed the exception to cover any
boycott prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Although these cases followed a broad construction of the boycott
exception, none of them specifically discussed in depth the issue of
standing to invoke section 3(b). However, they did signal the devel-
opment of a different, more liberal approach to the issues of stand-
ing and the scope of the boycott exception.
IV. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
In May 1977, the First Circuit rendered its decision in Barry v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." This decision was the first case to
discuss thoroughly the legislative history of section 3(b) and exam-
ine the policy reasons behind the provision. After doing so, the court
opted for a broad construction of the boycott exception."
In Barry, plantiffs alleged that St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. and other insurance companies doing business in Rhode Island
unlawfully conspired in restraint of trade by jointly attempting to
shrink malpractice coverage available to Rhode Island doctors. 3 St.
Paul changed its future malpractice policies to cover only on a
commerce and that the learned profession doctrine exempted the defendant's activity from
the antitrust laws.
89. Id. at 1078.
90. Id.
91. 555 F.2d 3 (lst Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id. at 5. The court defined a boycott as a "concerted refusal to deal" with a disfavored
purchaser or seller. Id., citing Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that a boycott of customers is a boycott for antitrust
purposes. Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
The court in Barry stated that although consumers are less frequently the prey of illegal
boycotts than are retailers, the features that make boycotts objectionable do not disappear
when consumers are boycotted. Id. at 7-8, n. 4. These include: restraint on traders "ability
to sell in accordance with their own judgment", the depriving of a free and competitive
market in which consumers may buy, and "interference with the natural flow of interstate
commerce." Id., citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. at 212-13.
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"claims made" basis rather than on an "occurrence" basis. 4 When
disgruntled policyholders attempted to obtain occurrence basis cov-
erage from other companies, the other companies refused to sell
policies of any type. Plantiffs sought injunctive relief and treble
damages." Although the claim involved a violation of federal anti-
trust statutes by insurance companies, the plantiffs sought to in-
voke the section 3(b) boycott exception.
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Coffin emphatically re-
jected the narrow reading given to the boycott provision by
Transnational and its progeny. 6 The court carefully pointed out
that Transnational's narrow reading of the boycott provision was a
relatively recent development in the case law and that the source
of this narrow reading was first announced by only a district court."
The chief reason for the reluctance of the First Circuit to follow the
Transnational interpretation was that the decision in Transnational
failed to "go behind the statutory language" of section 3(b).9 The
First Circuit saw no need to probe into the legislative history of the
statute to determine the true meaning of its language. Such an
investigation was only necessary if the language was ambiguous or
"[i]f . . . the language literally read produced a senseless or un-
workable statute."9 Here, the court found the words "agreement to
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimi-
dation" within the context of the Sherman Act to be unambi-
guous.'00 Therefore there was no reason to delve into the legislative
history on the grounds of ambiguous language.
The reason stated by the Transnational cases for their excursion
into the legislative history was the supposed "vitiation" of the
McCarran Act if the boycott exception were given its normal Sher-
man Act scope.' The First Circuit examined this alleged justifica-
tion and concluded that the fears of the other courts of
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id., citing Massachusetts Financial Service, Inc. v. Securities Investor Protection
Corp., 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976).
100. Id. The court defined boycott as a " '[cloncerted refusal to deal' with a disfavored
purchaser or seller." Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
101. Id. at 8. See Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975);
Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974).
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"emasculating" the McCarran Act were unfounded.' 7 The court
stated that the states continued to have vast powers to tax and to
regulate the business of insurance even if the boycott exception is
construed broadly.'03
The court next found that the narrow reading of the boycott ex-
ception lacked support in public policy.'04 The primary aim of anti-
trust laws is the assurance to consumers of the benefits of a free
market economy."'5 The court stated that excluding consumers of
insurance from the protection afforded by the boycott exception was
against a basic policy of antitrust law.'"6 In addition, the court found
the narrow anti-consumer interpretation to conflict with the Su-
preme Court's view that the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a whole is
meant to apply to the relationship between policyholders and their
insurers.'"" In general, the court saw the boycott provision as con-
forming with the nation's antitrust policies and that therefore there
was no need to look to the legislative history for a special and narrow
meaning.""
Despite these reasons for not focusing on the legislative history of
the boycott provision, the court felt compelled to examine it in
response to Transnational's use of such history.'"0 The First Circuit
noted that the reports accompanying the bills both stated that the
"provisions of the Sherman Act [were to] remain in full force and
effect" when the boycott exception was invoked." 0 Turning to the
debates in Congress, the court determined that the bills had been
broadened during this stage."' The court pointed out the exchanges
between Senators O'Mahoney and Pepper on the conference bill
concerning the continuing application of the Sherman Act to
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. The court noted that only the Sherman Act was made applicable by the boycott
provision, The Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts could still be pre-empted by
state regulation. In addition, not every violation of the Sherman Act can be characterized as
an act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court viewed the narrow interpretation of section 3(b) as an artificial reading
of the boyc6tt provision.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 10.
Ill. Id. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
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"private regulation by combinations" of insurance companies."' To
emphasize the broad scope of section 3(b), the court closed its exam-
ination of the exception with an excerpt from Senator O'Mahoney's
speech concerning his view that the boycott section would be suffi-
cient to prevent even combinations that did not involve boycott,
coercion, or intimidation."' In summation the court stated, "[W]e
simply do not find in these debates or reports any evidence that
would justify our reading the boycott provision in the special way
urged by the appellees." ' The court therefore rejected the narrow
interpretation given to section 3(b) by Transnational and the line
of cases which followed its lead.
V. Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
Soon after the Barry decision,"' the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia decided Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co."' In Proctor, owners of four automobile repair shops
brought suit against five insurers and two claims adjusters."7 They
alleged that the claims adjustment and settlement practices of the
insurers involved price-fixing and a group boycott in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act."' The plantiff-appellants contended
112. Id. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
113. Id. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
114. Id. at 12. A dissent by Circuit Judge Campbell pointed out that because Rhode Island
regulated the business of insurance, "[u]nder the clear implication of § 1012, neither the
Sherman Act nor the other antitrust laws apply except insofar as the § 1013(b) exception
permits." Id. at 14. Judge Campbell felt that the exception was not meant to encompass all
activities in violation of the Sherman Act because Congress did not use the Sherman Act's
broad "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" language in section 3(b). Id.
His view of the legislative history resulted in a narrow reading of the exception because he
felt this was more consistent with section 1012 and with "[t~he purpose and structure of the
act generally." Id. Judge Campbell believed that to introduce a new category of federal
antitrust suits would further strain the already over-crowded federal courts. In addition, he
felt that this could have "unforeseeable effects" upon state regulation policies. Id. at 15.
115. The Proctor decision was announced 32 days after Barry. The decision did not ex-
pressly utilize the Barry decision.
116. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
117. Id. at 263-65.
118. Id. at 263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Plantiffs charged that the defendants had
engaged in a combination and conspiracy to (1) fix the hourly labor rates paid to auto repair
shops; (2) coerce and intimidate repair shops to complete work for insured parties at fixed
rates; and (3) boycott shops which refused to accede to the fixed rates. Id. at 264. The actual
price-fixing allegation was that "Itihe five insurance companies had entered into a horizon-
tal agreement to pay or reimburse their policyholders according to a common formula which
involved the 'prevailing labor rate,' a standardized estimate of the amount of labor required,
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that the Sherman Act was applicable against these insurers because
of the boycott exception and they sought treble damages and injunc-
tive relief pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act."9 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance compa-
nies on the basis of the McCarran Act's antitrust exemption. 20
Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment
because of the failure of appellants to adequately support in the
record their allegation of a group boycott.' Nevertheless, it rejected
the district court's narrow reading of the boycott exception. 2
The Proctor decision closely, followed the reasoning of the Barry
court in adopting a broadened construction of the boycott excep-
tion. The court pointed to the "plain language' ' 2 of section 3(b) as
being the true embodiment of the meaning of the statute. The
Proctor court was as disdainful of Transnational's scanty examina-
tion of section 3(b)'s legislative history as was the Barry court.'24
Proctor, like Barry, thoroughly examined the legislative history of
the boycott exception and did not merely rely on Congressman
Celler's blacklist speech, the only speech to mention blacklists.'
The court found that a narrow construction was not intended by
Congress. It specifically pointed to the remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney which indicated that his concern was more general. In
assessing the importance of the boycott exception, he stated, "...
[any attempt by a small group of insurance companies to enter
into an agreement by which. they would penalize any person or
business which was attempting to do business in the insurance field
in a way that was disapproved by them, would be absolutely prohib-
and a compulsory discount on parts." Id.
119. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
120. 406 F. Supp. 27, 30 (D.D.C. 1975). The court found the practices involved here to be
within the meaning of the business of insurance. Id. It found that "[tlhe challenged practices
are regulated by state law to the degree required to support an exemption from federal law
under the Act." Id. at 30-31. The district court felt that "(tihe claims of dispute as to a
material fact . ..are vague and lack adequate record support." Id. at 31. In addition, the
court, relying on Transnational, held that even if appellants' charges were sufficiently docu-
mented, the boycott exception would be inapplicable as a matter of law. Id. at 32.
121. 561 F.2d at 276.
122. Id, at 272.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 272-73.
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The court further supported the view of a broad construction of
section 3(b) by pointing to the South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion.'2 The indictment in that case alleged, a conspiracy by an asso-
ciation of insurance companies and agents to fix premium rates and
monopolize the insurance business.' 28 The indictment also charged
additional violations of the Sherman Act involving practices in aid
of the price-fixing and monopoly scheme. The Proctor court noted
that the Supreme Court used the terms "boycott," "coercion," and
"intimidation" to describe these additional practices. 2 The court
felt that the "boycott provision of the McCarran Act was intended
to preserve South-Eastern Underwriters to the extent that the latter
subjected acts of 'boycott, coercion or intimidation' to the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act."'30 It also noted that "while a blacklist
of insurance companies and agents was alleged in. South-Eastern
Underwriters another type of boycott was also involved:
policyholders of insurance companies that were not members of the
association 'were threatened with boycotts and withdrawal of all
patronage'!'"aI
However, the court did not characterize the basic rate-fixing
agreement in South-Eastern Underwriters as an instance of
"boycott, coercion, or intimidation.' ' 2 It reasoned that there must
be "something in the way of enforcement activity" in. a rate-setting
context before a claim can sufficiently be made which falls within
the Act's meaning of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.'33
The scope which the District of Columbia Circuit gave to section
3(b) was not as broad as the one given by the First Circuit. The
Proctor court believed that the exception did not cover all acts of
boycott, coercion, or intimdation and all agreements to boycott,
coerce, or intimidate.' 34 To avoid the swallowing of the antitrust
exemption by the boycott exception, the court suggested that the
126. Id. at273, n. 19, citing 91 Cong. Rec. 1480 (1945) (emphasis in original).
127. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
128. Id. at 535-36.
129. 561 F.2d at 273, citing 322 U.S. at 535-36.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 274.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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terms of section 3(b) "must be applied in such a way as to accomo-
date the respective purposes of the Act's antitrust exemption, on the
one hand, and the boycott exception to the exemption, on the
other."'' 5 It concluded that to find a claim based on the boycott
exception "something in the way of enforcement activity" in a rate-
setting context must be found."' This test marks a moderate path
in the application of the exception.
VI. Conclusion
The narrow construction given to the boycott provision in
Transnational and its progeny has come under serious attack ap-
proximately eleven years after it was first espoused. The well-
reasoned and researched decisions in both Barry and Proctor reflect
a rejection of the idea of limiting standing to invoke section 3(b) to
insurance agents and companies who are the subjects of a blacklist.
The rise of consumer awareness, the notion that the antitrust laws
were created primarily for the protection of the consumer, as well
as the McCarran Act's focus on the insurer-policyholder relation-
ship have led the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit
to uphold the right of consumers to invoke this exception in certain
circumstances. The'reasoning used by these courts seems more
closely in line with the plain language of the statute and the true
intent of Congress.
Brian J McCarthy
135. Id.
136. Id,
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